



The US law permitting permanent expatriates to vote in federal
elections needs to be placed on a sturdier constitutional footing
US Citizens have a right to vote in federal elections in their former states even if they have
permanently left the country. Brian Kalt argues that this right, and the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act from which it flows, has constitutional problems given that those
who have left are no longer ‘people of the state’. He writes that Congress cannot simply rewrite
states’ voter-eligibility requirements as it pleases. He suggests that to address the problem,
Congress could establish territory-style representation in the form of non-voting House delegates
or piggyback reforms on to the proposed National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.
Eligible voters who have left the U.S. permanently can vote in federal elections as though they still live at their last
stateside address. They need not be residents of their former states, or be eligible to vote in state and local
elections, or pay any state or local taxes. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act  (UOCAVA),
enacted in 1986, forces their former states to let them vote for President, Senate, and House this way.
This is unconstitutional and should be changed. I am sympathetic to my fellow citizens who have given up their
stateside residences but prize their voting rights; I argue that Congress can best address these constitutional
problems by expanding voting rights rather than reducing them.
UOCAVA has many constitutional deficiencies. Voting for Congress is supposed to be a matter not just of
citizenship but of place, but UOCAVA sprinkles millions of voters into states and districts that are no longer their
places.
The Constitution states that federal representatives are supposed to be chosen by “the people of the several
states,” and senators from each state by “the people thereof.” But people who have left the country permanently
are not “people of the state” where they vote. The Constitution also specifies that people who vote for federal
representatives and senators must be qualified to vote for their state’s house of representatives. UOCAVA ignores
this requirement too.
As for presidential elections, states choose for themselves how to cast their electoral votes. Congress cannot
simply rewrite states’ voter-eligibility requirements as it pleases. Of course, there are constitutional provisions that
hem in the states here—they cannot deny the vote on the basis of sex, or race, and other such things. But denying
the vote on grounds that someone no longer lives in the state violates no such provisions.
When Congress debated the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (OCRVA) in the 1970s—UOCAVA’s
predecessor, which first set things up this way—it thought it could act because of its power to protect citizens’
rights to vote and to live where they pleased. Despite constitutional objections from some members and from the
Department of Justice, the law’s proponents felt that these rights trumped any technicalities. (That view did not
carry the day; instead, there was a general sense that members should just pass the law and leave consideration
of the Constitution to the courts. It is forty years later, though, and no court has spoken on the issue.)
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The rights to vote and to live where one pleases are certainly important. Congress has a general power, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to vindicate rights like these. Indeed, just before OCVRA’s enactment,
the Supreme Court approved voting legislation that protected federal voting rights for people who moved
interstate just before an election. But by applying overseas, and forever, OCVRA went too far. For OCVRA to
come under Congress’s Section 5 power it would have to be a Fourteenth Amendment violation for states to
preclude former residents from voting—and it isn’t.
One stark contrast makes this clear. If my rights as a U.S. citizen to vote in federal elections and to live where I
please are so sacrosanct, why do my fellow citizens who live in Washington, D.C. not have a right to vote for
Congress? Why do U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have no
right to vote for Congress or for President?
It is odd that I would retain my federal voting rights if I emigrated to North Korea but would lose them if I moved to
D.C. or a U.S. territory. But courts have ruled consistently that it is constitutional to deprive the latter citizens—
who are not “people of a state”—of any vote for Congress or President. Since that is constitutional, then it would
be constitutional for my state to stop letting me vote here if I emigrated to another country. And since that is
constitutional, Congress has no power to force my state to do otherwise.
There was one other Section 5 justification for OCVRA: equal protection. Before OCVRA, most states—
encouraged by earlier federal laws—chose to allow overseas military personnel, federal employees, and their
dependents to vote at their stateside addresses. They typically did not extend this courtesy to private expatriates,
though, and OCVRA prevented the states from continuing such disparate treatment. But while Congress had the
power to prevent such disparate treatment, it lacked the power to do so this radically. States can be forced to be
even-handed to absentee voters without being forced to treat permanent expatriates as quasi-citizens for life.
What to do? One legislative solution would be to let permanent expatriates vote, just in the right place. Permanent
expatriates do have an interest in federal law and policy (particularly given the unusual way that the U.S. taxes its
expatriates), but their interests are geographically distinct. As such, Congress could establish representation for
permanent expatriates similar to that enjoyed by residents of the territories: dedicated, non-voting delegates in the
House. By concentrating permanent expatriates’ votes this way, their interests would be represented more directly
than by spreading them thinly over 435 districts where more local concerns are (appropriately) given higher
priority. More importantly, this kind of representation would not be unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, losing voting representation in the House and all representation in the Senate and the Electoral
College would be a step back for permanent expatriates’ voting rights. It would make permanent expatriates no
worse off than U.S. citizens who live in the territories. Still, finding a way to preserve permanent expatriates’ voting
rights, especially for President, is a worthy goal and an essential one if there is to be any real chance of Congress
taking action.
One possibility would piggyback on the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), a clever suggestion
for switching to a national popular vote that has recently gained momentum. The NPVIC leverages the states’
ability to decide how to allocate their own electoral votes; member states agree to award their electoral votes to
the winner of the national popular vote, but only when enough states to constitute a majority of the Electoral
College have signed on. If the NPVIC passes, or if Congress gets in front of it and passes a constitutional
amendment to institute a national popular vote for President, it would present a perfect opportunity to discuss the
proper scope of who gets included in the national popular vote. It would be an optimal time, in other words, to give
proper presidential voting rights to permanent expatriates and citizens living in the territories.
UOCAVA is unconstitutional but entrenched, because so many people—understandably—care more about
citizens getting to vote than they do about constitutional niceties. But there is no reason that voting rights for
permanent expatriates needs to come at such a price. Permanent expatriates can be enfranchised without
disrespecting the Constitution.
This article is based on the paper ‘Unconstitutional But Entrenched: Putting UOCAVA and Voting Rights for
Permanent Expatriates on a Sound Constitutional Footing’, in the Brooklyn Law Review.
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